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Abstract
In 1927 Heisenberg discovered that the “more precisely the position is determined, the less
precisely the momentum is known in this instant, and vice versa”. Four years later Go¨del showed
that a finitely specified, consistent formal system which is large enough to include arithmetic is
incomplete. As both results express some kind of impossibility it is natural to ask whether there
is any relation between them, and, indeed, this question has been repeatedly asked for a long
time. The main interest seems to have been in possible implications of incompleteness to physics.
In this note we will take interest in the converse implication and will offer a positive answer to the
question: Does uncertainty imply incompleteness? We will show that algorithmic randomness
is equivalent to a “formal uncertainty principle” which implies Chaitin’s information-theoretic
incompleteness. We also show that the derived uncertainty relation, for many computers, is
physical. In fact, the formal uncertainty principle applies to all systems governed by the wave
equation, not just quantum waves. This fact supports the conjecture that uncertainty implies
algorithmic randomness not only in mathematics, but also in physics.
1 Introduction
Are there any connections between uncertainty and incompleteness? We don’t know of any reaction
of Heisenberg to this question. However, Go¨del’s hostility to any suggestion regarding possible
connections between his incompleteness theorem and physics, particularly, Heisenberg’s uncertainty
relation, is well-known.1 One of the obstacles in establishing such a connection comes from the
different nature of these two results: uncertainty is a quantitative phenomenon while incompleteness
is prevalently qualitative.
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1J. Wheeler was thrown out of Go¨del’s office for asking the question “Professor Go¨del, what connection do you
see between your incompleteness theorem and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle?”, cf. Chaitin’s account cited in
Barrow [1], p. 221.
In recent years there have been a lot of interest in the relations between computability and incom-
pleteness and physics. Opinions vary considerably, from the conclusion that the impact on Go¨del
and Turing incompleteness theorems to physics is a red herring (see [7, 8]), to Hawking’s view that
“a physical theory is self-referencing, like in Go¨del’s theorem. . . . Theories we have so far are
both inconsistent and incomplete” (cf. [22]). A very interesting analysis of the possible impact of
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems in physics was written by Barrow [1, 2]; the prevalence of physics
over mathematics is argued by Deutsch [17]; for Svozil [30, 31], Heisenberg’s incompleteness is
pre-Go¨delian-Turing and finite. Other relevant papers are Geroch and Hartle [21], Peres [27], and
Peres and Zurek [28].
In this note we do not ask whether Go¨del’s incompleteness has any bearing on Heisenberg’s uncer-
tainty, but the converse: Does uncertainty imply incompleteness? We will show that we can get
a positive answer to this question: algorithmic randomness can be recast as a “formal uncertainty
principle” which implies Chaitin’s information-theoretic version of Go¨del’s incompleteness.
2 Outline
We begin with overviews of the relevant ideas first discovered by Heisenberg, Go¨del, and Chaitin.
Next, we show that random reals, of which Chaitin Omega numbers are just an example, satisfy a
“formal uncertainty principle”, namely
∆s ·∆C(ω1 . . . ωs) ≥ ε, (1)
where ε is a fixed positive constant.
The two conjugate coordinates are the random real and the binary numbers describing the programs
that generate its prefixes. Then, the uncertainty in the random real given an n-bit prefix is 2−n, and
the uncertainty in the size of the shortest program that generates it is, to within a multiplicative
constant, 2n.
The Fourier transform is a lossless transformation, so all the information contained in the delta
function δΩ(x) = 1 if x = Ω, δΩ(x) = 0, otherwise, is preserved in the conjugate. Therefore, if you
need n bits of information to describe a square wave convergent on the delta function, there must
be n bits of information in the Fourier transform of the square wave. Since both the information in
the transformed square wave and the shortest program describing the square wave increase linearly
with n, there is an equivalence between the two.
We show that the formal uncertainty principle is a true uncertainty principle–that is, the terms
are bounded by the standard deviations of two random variables with particular probability dis-
tributions. We note that for many self-delimiting Turing machines C, the halting probability ΩC
is computable; in these cases, there are quantum systems with observables described by these
probability distributions, and our uncertainty relation is equivalent to Heisenberg’s.
Finally, (1) implies a strong version of Go¨del’s incompleteness, Chaitin’s information-theoretic
version [9, 10] (see also the analysis in [16, 3]). Chaitin’s proof relied on measure theory; we present
here a new proof via a complexity-theoretic argument.
2
3 Heisenberg
In 1925 Heisenberg developed the theory of matrix mechanics; it was his opinion that only observ-
able quantities should play any role in a theory. At the time, all observations came in the form
of spectral absorption and emission lines. Heisenberg, therefore, considered the “transition quan-
tities” governing the jumps between energy states to be the fundamental concepts of his theory.
Together with Born, who realized Heisenberg’s transition rules obeyed the rules of matrix calculus,
he developed his ideas into a theory that predicted nearly all the experimental evidence available.
The next year, Schro¨dinger introduced what became known as wave mechanics, together with
a proof that the two theories were equivalent. Schro¨dinger argued that his version of quantum
mechanics was better in that one could visualize the behavior of the electrons in the atom. Many
other physicists agreed with him.
Schro¨dinger’s approach disgusted Heisenberg; in a letter to Pauli (see [26]), he called Schro¨dinger’s
interpretation “crap”. Publicly, however, he was more restrained. In [23] he argued that while
matrix mechanics was hard to visualize, Schro¨dinger’s interpretation of wave mechanics was self-
contradictory, and concluded that something was still missing from the interpretation of quantum
theory.
In 1927 Heisenberg published “U¨ber den Anschaulichen Inhalt der Quantentheoretischen Kinematik
und Mechanik” (see [24]) to provide the missing piece. First, he gave his own definition of visualiza-
tion: “We believe we have gained intuitive understanding of a physical theory, if in all simple cases,
we can grasp the experimental consequences qualitatively and see that the theory does not lead
to any contradictions.” In this sense, matrix mechanics was just as intuitive as wave mechanics.
Next, he argued that terms like “the position of a particle” can only make sense in terms of the
experiment that measures them.
To illustrate, he considered the measurement of an electron by a microscope.2 The accuracy is
limited by the wavelength of the light illuminating the electron; one can use as short a wavelength
as one wishes, but for very short wavelengths, the Compton effect is non-negligible. He wrote, (see
[24], p.174–175),
At the instant of time when the position is determined, that is, at the instant when the
photon is scattered by the electron, the electron undergoes a discontinuous change in
momentum. This change is the greater the smaller the wavelength of the light employed,
i.e., the more exact the determination of the position. At the instant at which the
position of the electron is known, its momentum therefore can be known only up to
magnitudes which correspond to that discontinuous change; thus, the more precisely
the position is determined, the less precisely the momentum is known, and conversely.
Heisenberg estimated the uncertainty to be on the order
δp · δq ∼ h¯,
where h¯ is Planck’s constant over 2pi.
2Heisenberg might have been so concerned with uncertainty because in 1923 he almost failed his Ph.D. exam when
Sommerfeld asked about (optical) limitations to the resolution of the microscope.
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Kennard (see [25]) was the first to publish the uncertainty relation in its exact form. He proved in
1927 that for all normalized state vectors |Ψ〉,
∆p ·∆q ≥ h¯/2,
where ∆p and ∆q are standard deviations of momentum and position, i.e.
∆2p = 〈Ψ|p
2|Ψ〉 − 〈Ψ|p|Ψ〉2; ∆2q = 〈Ψ|q
2|Ψ〉 − 〈Ψ|q|Ψ〉2.
Thus, assuming quantummechanics is an accurate description of reality, the formalism is compatible
with Heisenberg’s principle.
4 Go¨del
In 1931 Go¨del published his (first) incompleteness theorem in [20] (see also [18, 19]). According
to the current terminology, he showed that every formal system which is (1) finitely specified, (2)
rich enough to include the arithmetic, and (3) consistent, is incomplete. That is, there exists an
arithmetical statement which (A) can be expressed in the formal system, (B) is true, but (C) is
unprovable within the formal system.
All conditions are necessary. Condition (1) says that there is an algorithm listing all axioms and
inference rules (which could be infinite). Taking as axioms all true arithmetical statements will not
do, as this set is not finitely listable. A “true arithmetical statement” is a statement about non-
negative integers which cannot be invalidated by finding any combination of non-negative integers
that contradicts it. Condition (2) says that the formal systems has all the symbols and axioms
used in arithmetic, the symbols for 0 (zero), S (successor), + (plus), × (times), = (equality) and
the axioms making them work (as for example, x + S(y) = S(x + y)). Condition (2) cannot be
satisfied if you do not have individual terms for 0, 1, 2, . . .; for example, Tarski [33] proved that the
plane Euclidean geometry, which refers to points, circles and lines, is complete.3 Finally (3) means
that the formal system is free of contradictions.
Like uncertainty, incompleteness has provoked a lot of interest (and abuse).
5 Chaitin
Chaitin has obtained three types of information-theoretic incompleteness results (scattered through
different publications, [9, 10, 11, 13]; see also [14, 15]). The strongest form concerns the computation
of the bits of a Chaitin Omega number ΩU , the halting probability of a self-delimiting universal
Turing machine U (see also the analysis in [16, 3]). A self-delimiting Turing machine C is a normal
Turing machine C which processes binary strings into binary strings and has a prefix-free domain,
that is, if C(x) is defined and y is either a proper prefix or an extension of x, then C(y) is not defined.
The self-delimiting Turing machine U is universal if for every self-delimiting Turing machine C there
exists a fixed binary string p (the simulator) such that for every input x, U(px) = C(x): either
3This result combined with with Go¨del’s completeness theorem implies decidability: there is an algorithm which
accepts as input an arbitrary statement of plane Euclidean geometry, and outputs “true” if the statement is true,
and “false” if it is false. The contrast between the completeness of plane Euclidean geometry and the incompleteness
of arithmetic is striking.
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both computations U(px) and C(x) stop and, in this case they produce the same output or both
computations never stop. The Omega number introduced in [9]
ΩU = 0.ω1ω2 . . . ωn . . . (2)
is the halting probability of U ; it is one of the most important concepts in algorithmic information
theory (see [3]).
In [9] Chaitin proved the following result: Assume that X is a formal system satisfying conditions
(1), (2) and (3) in Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem. Then, for every self-delimiting universal Turing
machine U , X can determine the positions and values of only finitely scattered bits of ΩU , and
one can give a bound on the number of bits of ΩU which X can determine. This is a form of
incompleteness because, with the exception of finitely many n, any true statement of the form “the
nth bit of ΩU is ωn” is unprovable in X.
For example, we can take X to be ZFC4 under the assumption that it is arithmetically sound, that
is, any theorem of arithmetic proved by ZFC is true. Solovay [29] has constructed a specific self-
delimiting universal Turing machine S (called Solovay machine) such that ZFC cannot determine
any bit of ΩS. In this way one can obtain constructive versions of Chaitin’s theorem. For example,
if ZFC is arithmetically sound and S is a Solovay machine, then the statement “the 0th bit of the
binary expansion of ΩS is 0” is true but unprovable in ZFC. In fact, one can effectively construct
arbitrarily many examples of true and unprovable statements of the above form, cf. [4].
6 Rudiments of Algorithmic Information Theory
In this section we will present some basic facts of algorithmic information theory in a slightly
different form which is suitable for the results appearing in the following section.
We will work with binary strings; the length of the string x is denoted by |x|. For every n ≥ 0 we
denote by B(n) the binary representation of the number n+1 without the leading 1. For example,
0 7→ λ (the empty string), 1 7→ 0, 2 7→ 1, 3 7→ 00, . . . The length of B(n) is almost equal
to log2(n); more precisely, it is ⌊log2(n + 1)⌋. The function B is bijective and we denote by N its
inverse. The string x is length-lexicographically less than the string y if and only if N(x) < N(y).
We need first the Kraft-Chaitin theorem: Let n1, n2, . . . be a computable sequence of non-negative
integers such that
∞∑
i=1
2−ni ≤ 1. (3)
Then, we can effectively construct a prefix-free sequence of strings (that is, no wi is a proper prefix
of any wj with i 6= j) w1, w2, . . . such that for each i ≥ 1, |wi| = ni.
Let C be a self-delimiting Turing machine. The program-size complexity induced by C is defined
by HC(x) = min{|w| | C(w) = x} (with the convention that strings not produced by C have infinite
complexity). One might suppose that the complexity of a string would vary greatly between choices
of self-delimiting Turing machine. However, because of the universality requirement, the complexity
difference between C and C ′ is at most the length of the shortest program for C ′ that simulates
C. Therefore, the complexity of a string is fixed to within an additive constant. This is known as
4Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice.
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the “invariance theorem” (see [3]), and is usually stated: For every self-delimiting universal Turing
machine U and self-delimiting Turing machine C there exists a constant ε > 0 (which depends upon
U and C) such that for every string x,
HU(x) ≤ ε+HC(x).
For our aim it is more convenient to define the complexity measure ∇C(x) = min{N(w) | C(w) =
x}, the smallest integer whose binary representation produces x via C. Clearly, for every string x,
2HC(x) − 1 ≤ ∇C(x) < 2
HC(x)+1 − 1.
Therefore we can say that ∆C(x), our uncertainty in the value ∇C(x), is the difference between
the upper and lower bounds given, namely ∆C(x) = 2
HC(x).
The invariance theorem can now be stated as follows: for every self-delimiting universal Turing
machine U and self-delimiting Turing machine C there exists a constant ε > 0 (which depends upon
U and C) such that for every string x,
∆U (x) ≤ ε ·∆C(x).
Let ∆s = 2
−s. Chaitin’s theorem (see [9]) stating that the bits of ΩU in (2) form a random sequence
can now be presented as a “formal uncertainty principle”: for every self-delimiting Turing machine
C there is a constant ε > 0 (which depends upon U and C) such that
∆s ·∆C(ω1 . . . ωs) ≥ ε. (4)
The inequality (4) is an uncertainty relation as it reflects a limit to which we can simultaneously
increase both the accuracy with which we can approximate ΩU and the complexity of the initial
sequence of bits we compute; it relates the uncertainty of the output to the size of the input.
When s grows indefinitely, ∆s tends to zero, in contrast with ∆C(ω1 . . . ωs) which tends to infinity;
their product is not only bounded from below, but increases indefinitely (see also (6)). From a
complexity viewpoint (4) tells us that there is a limit ε up to which we can uniformly compress the
initial prefixes of the binary expansion of ΩU .
How large can be ε in (4)? For example, ε = 1 when C = U0 is a special universal self-delimiting
Turing machine:
∆s ·∆U0(ω1 . . . ωs) ≥ 1. (5)
If U is universal and satisfies (4), then a universal machine U0 satisfying (5) can be defined by
U0(0
εx) = U(x) (so requiring that any input to U0 not starting with ε zeros causes the machine to
go into an infinite loop).
In fact, in view of the strong complexity-theoretic characterization of random sequences (see [9, 3])
a stronger form of (4) is true: for every positive integer N there is a bound M (which depends upon
U , C and N) such that for all s ≥M we have:
∆s ·∆C(ω1 . . . ωs) ≥ N. (6)
The constant N appearing in (4) can be made arbitrarily large in case s is large enough; the price
paid appears in the possible violation of the inequality for the first s < M bits.
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Is (4) a ‘true’ uncertainty relation? We prove that the variables ∆s and ∆C in (4) are standard
deviations of two measurable observables in suitable probability spaces.
For ∆s we consider the space of all real numbers in the unit interval which are approximated
to exactly s digits. Consider the probability distribution Prob(v) = PC(v)/Ω
s
C , where PC(x) =∑
C(y)=x 2
−|y| and ΩsC =
∑
|x|=s PC(x).
Now fix the first s digits of ΩU , ω1ω2 . . . ωs and define
α = 2−s/2 · (Prob(ω1ω2 . . . ωs))
−1/2 · (1− Prob(ω1ω2 . . . ωs))
−1/2.
The random variable X on a real approximated by the first s digits v = v1v2 . . . vs is defined by the
delta function X(v) = α if v = ω1ω2 . . . ωs and X(v) = 0 otherwise. Then the expectation values
of X and X2 are 〈X〉 = α · Prob(ω1ω2 . . . ωs) and 〈X
2〉 = α2 · Prob(ω1ω2 . . . ωs), so the standard
deviation is σX = ∆s.
For ∆C we consider
β = (∆C(ω1ω2 . . . ωs))
1/2 · (Prob(ω1ω2 . . . ωs))
−1/2 · (1− Prob(ω1ω2 . . . ωs))
−1/2,
and the same space but the random variable Y (ω1ω2 . . . ωs) = β and Y (v) = 0 if v 6= ω1ω2 . . . ωs.
Then, the expectation values of Y and Y 2 are 〈Y 〉 = β · Prob(ω1ω2 . . . ωs) and 〈Y
2〉 = β2 ·
Prob(ω1ω2 . . . ωs), so the standard deviation is σY = ∆C(ω1ω2 . . . ωs).
Hence the relation (4) becomes:
σX · σY = ∆s ·∆C(ω1ω2 . . . ωs) ≥ ε,
so for U0 satisfying (5) we have:
σX · σY ≥ 1.
7 From Heisenberg to Chaitin
Since self-delimiting universal Turing machines are strictly more powerful than non-universal ones,
the inequality holds for the weaker computers as well. In many of these cases, the halting probability
of the machine is computable, and we can construct a quantum algorithm to produce a set of qubits
whose state is described by the distribution.
To illustrate, we consider a quantum algorithm with two parameters, C and s, where C is a
Turing machine for which the probability of producing each s-bit string is computable. We run
the algorithm to compute that distribution on a quantum computer with s ouput qubits; it puts
the output register into a superposition of spin states, where the probability of each state |v〉 is
PC(v)/Ω
s
C . Next, we apply the Hamiltonian operator H = β|ω1 . . . ωs〉〈ω1 . . . ωs| to the prepared
state. A measurement of energy will give β with probability P = Prob(ω1ω2 . . . ωs) and zero with
probability 1 − P . The expectation value for energy, therefore, is exactly the same as that of Y ,
but with units of energy, i.e.
∆C(ω1ω2 . . . ωs)[J ] ·∆s ≥ ε[J ],
where [J ] indicates Joules of energy.
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Now define
∆t ≡
σQ
|d〈Q〉/dt|
,
where Q is any observable that does not commute with the Hamiltonian; that is, ∆t is the time it
takes for the expectation value of Q to change by one standard deviation. With this definition, the
following is a form of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle:
∆E ·∆t ≥ h¯/2.
We can replace ∆E by ∆C(ω1ω2 . . . ωs) by the analysis above; but what about ∆t? If we choose
a time scale such that our two uncertainty relations are equivalent for a single quantum system
corresponding to a computer C and one value of s, then the relation holds for C and any value of
s:
∆C(ω1ω2 . . . ωs)[J ] ·∆s
h¯
2ε
[J−1 · Js] ≥
h¯
2
[Js].
In this sense, we claim that Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation is equivalent to (4). We cannot say
whether (4) is physical for universal self-delimiting Turing machines; to do so requires deciding the
Church-Turing thesis for quantum systems.
The uncertainty principle now says that getting one more bit of ΩU requires (asymptotically) twice
as much energy. Note, however, that we have made an arbitrary choice to identify energy with
complexity. We could have chosen to create a system in which the position of a particle corresponded
to the complexity, while momentum corresponded to the accuracy of C’s estimate of ΩU . In that
case, the uncertainty in the position would double for each extra bit. Any observable can play
either role, with a suitable choice of units.
If this were the only physical connection, one could argue that the result is merely an analogy
and nothing more. However, consider the following: let ρ be the density matrix of a quantum
state. Let R be a computable positive operator-valued measure, defined on a finite dimensional
quantum system, whose elements are each labeled by a finite binary string. Then the statistics of
outcomes in the quantum measurement is described by R: R(ω1 . . . ωs) is the measurement outcome
and tr(ρR(ω1 . . . ωs)) is the probability of getting that outcome when we measure ρ. Under these
hypotheses, Tadaki’s inequality (1) (see [32], p. 2), and our inequality (4) imply the existence of a
constant τ (depending upon R) such that for all ρ and s we have:
∆s .
1
tr(ρR(ω1 . . . ωs))
≥ τ.
In other words, there is no algorithm that, for all s, can produce
1. an experimental setup to produce a quantum state and
2. a POVM with which to measure the state such that
3. the probability of getting the result ω1ω2 . . . ωs is greater than 1/(τ2
s).
Finally, it is interesting to note that a Fourier transform of the wave function switches between
an “Omega space” and a “complexity space”. We plan on examining this relationship further in a
future paper.
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8 From Chaitin to Go¨del
In this section we prove that the uncertainty relation (4) implies incompleteness.
We start with the following theorem: Fix a universal self-delimiting Turing machine U . Let x1x2 . . .
be a binary infinite sequence and let F be a strictly increasing function mapping positive integers
into positive integers. If the set {(F (i), xF (i)) | i ≥ 1} is computable, then there exists a constant
ε > 0 (which depends upon U and the characteristic function of the above set) such that for all
k ≥ 1 we have:
∆U (x1x2 . . . xF (k)) ≤ ε · 2
F (k)−k. (7)
To prove (7) we consider for every k ≥ 1 the strings
w1xF (1)w2xF (2) . . . wkxF (k), (8)
where each wj is a string of length F (j)−F (j−1)−1, F (0) = 0, that is, all binary strings of length
F (k) where we have fixed bits at the positions F (1), . . . , F (k).
It is clear that
∑k
i=1 |wi| = F (k) − k and the mapping (w1, w2, . . . , wk) 7→ w1w2 . . . wk is bijective,
hence to generate all strings of the form (8) we only need to generate all strings of length F (k)− k.
Next we consider the enumeration of all strings of the form (8) for k = 1, 2, . . .. The lengths of
these strings will form the sequence
F (1), F (1), . . . , F (1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
2F (1)−1 times
, . . . , F (k), F (k), . . . , F (k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
2F (k)−k times
, . . .
which is computable and satisfies the inequality (3) as
∞∑
k=1
2F (k)−k · 2−F (k) = 1.
Hence, by Kraft-Chaitin theorem, for every string w of length F (k) − k there effectively exists a
string zw having the same length as w such that the set {zw | |w| = F (k)− k, k ≥ 1} is prefix-free.
Indeed, from a string w of length F (k)−k we get a unique decomposition w = w1 . . . wk, and zw as
above, so we can define C(zw) = w1xF (1)w2xF (2) . . . wkxF (k); C is a self-delimiting Turing machine.
Clearly,
∆C(w1xF (1)w2xF (2) . . . wkxF (k)) ≤ ∇C(w1xF (1)w2xF (2) . . . wkxF (k)) ≤ N(zw) ≤ 2
F (k)−k+1 − 1,
for all k ≥ 1. In particular, ∆C(x1 . . . xF (k)) ≤ 2
F (k)−k+1 − 1, so by the invariance theorem we get
the inequality (7).
It is easy to see that under the hypothesis of the above theorem the uncertainty relation (4) is
violated, so the sequence x1x2 . . . xn . . . is not random. Indeed, if the sequence were random, then
the formal uncertainty principle (4) will hold true, hence for each k ≥ 1, we would have the following
contradictory pair of inequalities:
ε1 ·
1
∆F (k)
≤ ∆U (x1 . . . xF (k)) ≤ ε · 2
F (k)−k.
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We are now able to deduce Chaitin’s information-theoretic incompleteness theorem from the un-
certainty relation (4). Assume by absurdity that ZFC can determine infinitely many digits of
ΩU = 0.ω1ω2 . . .. Then, we could enumerate an infinite sequence of digits of ΩU , thus contradicting
the above theorem.
In particular, there exists a bound N such that ZFC cannot determine more than N scattered
digits of ΩU = 0.ω1ω2 . . ..
9 Conclusion
We have shown that uncertainty implies algorithmic randomness which, in turn, implies incom-
pleteness. Specifically, the complexity-theoretic characterization of the randomness of the halt-
ing probability of a universal self-delimiting Turing machine U , Chaitin Omega number ΩU , can
be recast as a “formal uncertainty principle”: an uncertainty relation between the accuracy of
one’s estimate of ΩU and the complexity of the initial bit string. This relation implies Chaitin’s
information-theoretic version of Go¨del’s incompleteness.
The uncertainty relation applies to all self-delimiting Turing machines C. For the class of machines
whose halting probabilities ΩC are computable, we have shown that one can construct a quantum
computer for which the uncertainty relation describes conjugate observables. Therefore, in these
particular instances, the uncertainty relation is equivalent to Heisenberg’s.
There is an important distinction between “quantum randomness” and our formal uncertainty
principle. They are separate concepts. In the Copenhagen interpretation, the random collapse of
the wave-function is a postulate. In the Bohmian interpretation, where there are real particles
with real (though non-Newtonian) trajectories, randomness comes from our ignorance about the
system; the velocity of any particle depends instantaneously on every other particle. In one case
the interpretation is probabilistic, while in the other, it is completely deterministic. We cannot
distinguish between these. Our result concerns a different source of randomness.
Like Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, our formal uncertainty principle is a general one; they
both apply to all systems governed by the wave equation, not just quantum waves. We could, for
example, use sound waves instead of a quantum system by playing two pure tones with frequencies
f and f + ∆C(ω1 . . . ωs). Then ∆s corresponds to the complementary observable, the length of
time needed to perceive a beat. The (algorithmic) randomness we are concerned with seems to
be pervasive in physics, even at the classical level. We may speculate that uncertainty implies
randomness not only in mathematics, but also in physics.
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